xt7wwp9t4m2d https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dipstest/xt7wwp9t4m2d/data/mets.xml Illinois United States Works Progress Administration 1937 Other contributors include: Robert C. Lowe (Robert Chapin) and David S. Lander under the supervision of A. Ross Eckler; 15 pages, 27 cm; This bulletin is one of a series presenting state constitutional provisions affecting public welfare; Includes bibliographical references; UK holds archival copy for ASERL Collaborative Federal Depository Program libraries; Y 3.W 89/2:36/Il 6 books English Washington D.C.: Works Progress Administration Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Analysis of Constitutional Provisions Affecting Public Welfare in the State of Illinois text Analysis of Constitutional Provisions Affecting Public Welfare in the State of Illinois 1937 1937 2015 true xt7wwp9t4m2d section xt7wwp9t4m2d I
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° WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION
HARRY L. HOPKINS, ADMINISTRATOR
CORRINGTON GILL, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
HOWARD   MYERS, DIRECTOR
• DIVISION OF SOCIAL RESEARCH
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ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AFEECTING PUBLIC WELFARE IN THE STATE OE
ILLINOIS
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_ MARCH l, 1957
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PREPARED BY O
ROBERT C. LOWE AND DAv1¤ S. LANDER
LEGAL RESEARCH SECTION
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
A. Ross Ec•spec1f1cally
granted to lt by the Legislature, and the Legislature may not grant such power except
for a public purpose under this section. The building of a community hall 1s a public 1
purpose. Robbins vs. Kadyk, 312 Ill. 290, 143 N. E. 863 (1924). • I
8Const1tut1on, Art. IX, Sec. 10. ;
"The General Assemblymay lmpose taxes, local in the1r character against a munic- _ 
1pal corporatlon or the lnhabltahts thereof, lf required for the general good of the
state, because such taxes are not merely =•= =•= =•< for corporate purposes * =•= =•=.
The General Assembly may compel taxation by a municipal corporation for the performance
of duties as an agency of the state government >•= =•< >•=. It may compel a municipal 5
corporation to perform duties which relate to the general welfare and security of the , T
state * >•= >•=. It may require a county to build a courthouse, a ja1l, or a brldge, _
to support paupers, or to establish necessary regulatlons for public health and safety  
=•= ¤•= =•=. The malntenance and care of dependent children falls within the same class i
of duties and obligations as the support of paupers, the building and maintaining of w
jails, and the adm1n1strat1on of just1ce.•• St. Hedw1g•s Industrial School for Girls {
vs. Cook County, zoo Ill. 4:52, 124 N. E. 629, 632 (1919). (See page 3, par. (a) and ·
footnote 7.) _
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_ Illinois 5
• II. Financial Powers and Limitations-Continued
A. Taxation and Assessments-Continued
(8) Other Local Units-—Continued
of taxes within said city for corporate purposes in accordance with the
, principles of equality and uniformity prescribed by this Constitution;
I * * *. No law based upon this amendment to the Constitution, affecting
the municipal government of the city of Chicago, shall take effect until
° such law shall be consented to by a majority of the legal voters of said
city voting on the question at any election, general, municipal or spe-
cial; :{: :}: :}: · 9
B. Exem tions
P
• The property of the State,counties, and other munici-
pal corporations, both real and personal, and such other property as may
be used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for
school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes, may be exempted from
taxation;lnltsuch exemption shall be only by general law. In the assess-
• ment of real estate incumbered by public easement,any depreciation occa-
sionedby such easementmay be deductedixithe valuationof such property.1O
· 9Const1tut1on, Art. IV, Sec. 54, adopted (1904).
See page 5, footnote 7 for cases defining "corporate purpose".
1OConst1tut1on, Art. IX, Sec. 5.
• '•The enumerated class of property exempted by constitutional provision ls a lim-
itation on the power ofthe Legislature to exempt any other property, and all property
not within the exemption 1s subjectto taxat1on." People exrel. Mcbonoughvs. Chicago
Union Lime works Company, 561 Ill. 504. 198 N. E. 1 (1955).
"Thls constltutlonal provlslon is not self-executing, and exemptions, within
the limitations prescribed, exist only when created by a general law enacted by the
Leg1slature." Turnvereln "L1ncoln” vs. Board of Appeals of Cook County, 558 Ill.
155, 192 N. E. 780 (1954).
• *•The Legislature cannot broaden nor enlarge upon the exemptions of property
permitted by the Const1tut1on.” where school trustees owned certain property, which
was rented to a theatre, the income being used exclusively for school purposes, the
property was held not exempt from taxation, because it was not used for school pur-
poses. People ex rel. Glll vs. Trustees of Schools, 4 N. E. (2d) 16, 18 (1956).
Farm land, given to the Trustees of the Un1vers1tyofIll1no1s, the income there-
from to be used for deserving students, was held not exempt from taxation. The court
said (1) since certain restrictions were put on the use of the property that the
• State could not be said to own 1t for purposes of tax exemption; and (2)the property
was not used exclusively for school and religious purposes. People ex rel. Olmstead
vs. University of Illinois, 528 Ill. 577, 159 N. E. 811 (1928).
A cltyfarm, which was by a resolutlon of the Clty Council used as a nursery to
provide trees and shrubbery for city parks, was held exempt from taxation because it
was the property of a municipality. People ex rel. Sweitzer vs. City of Chicago,
565 Ill. 409, 2 N. E. (2d) 550 (1956).
A Masonic Temple, used for lodge purposes, was neld not to be used exclusively
* for charitable purposes within the meaning of this section and the statutes, and so
was not exempt from taxation. The court sald that the primary use to which the prop-
erty 1s put determines the question of tax exemption, and where one of several purposes
is charitable, as here, this ls not sufficient; the chief, if not the sole purpose,
must be charitable. People ex rel. Nelson vs. Rockford Masonic Temple Building
Association. 548 lll. 567, 181 N. E. 428 (1952).
A 200 acre farm, with buildings thereon, used exclusively for the care and
support of dependent Master Masons, was held to be used exclusively for charitable
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6 Illinois
II. Financial Powers and Limitations—Continued
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C. Borrowing and Use of Credit
(1) State
(a) * * * the State may, to meet casual deficits
or failures in revenues, contract debts, never to exceed in the aggregate •  
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars; and moneys thus borrowed shall 1
be applied to the purpose for which they were obtained, or to pay the
debt thus created, and to no other purpose; and no other debt, except for •
the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, or defending
the State in war (for payment of which the faith of the State shall be
pledged), shall be contracted, unless the law authorizing the same shall,
at a general election, have been submitted to the people and have received
a majority of the votes cast for members of the General Assembly at such ,
election. The General Assembly shall provide for the publication of said
law for three months, at least, before the vote of the people shall be
taken upon the same; and provision shall be made, at the time, for the
payment of the interest annually, as it shall accrue, by a tax levied
for the purpose, or from other sources of revenue; which law, providing ·
for the payment of such interest by such tax, shall be irrepealable until
such debt be paid: And, provided, further, that the law levying the tax
shall be submitted to the people with the law authorizing the debt to be ·
contracted.11
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purposes and so was exempt from taxation. Grand Lodge vs. Board of Review. 281 Ill.
480, 11*7 N. E. 1016 (191*7).
To exempt property as used for a charitable purpose It must be used directly
and exclusively for the charltable purpose, not indirectly by approprlating the
lssues and profits to charity. So where a farm was owned by an old peoples' home,
and rented to other persons, the income being used for the home, It was held not
exempt from taxation. People ex rel. Baldwin vs. Jessamine Withers Home, 312 Ill.
136, 143 N. E. 414 (1924). •
11Const1tut1on, Art. IV, Sec. 18.
A proposition authorizing the issuance and sale of State bofrE!%"t`o` the amount _
Of $30,000,000 for relief purposes,was approved by a majorityof the electors voting
for members of the General Assembly in the general election of November 1934. The
validity of the bond issue was questioned on the ground that there had not been a
sufficient publication of the election notice in accordance with the statute, since
the notlce had been published for part of the three months period in one newspaper •
and part In another newspaper. The court held that the publication satisfied this
section of the Const1tut1on,and that any additional statutory requirements were not
mandatory. People ex rel. Kerner vs. Martin, 359 Ill. 408, 194 N. E. 557 (1935).
where a $60,000,000 bond issue was authorized by a vote of the people for the
purpose of constructing a State-wide system of hard surfaced roads, 1t was held that
the routes of the roads constructed with the proceeds must conform substantially
with the routes as described in the Bond Issue Act. watts vs. Department of Public
works and Buildings, 328 Ill. 587, 160 N. E. 201 (1928). •
Tax anticipation notes or warrants, payable solely out of taxes already levied
but not yet collected, were held not to constitute a "debt” within the meaning of
this section, because when the taxes were levied they became an asset of the State
and could be considered Fconstructlvely in the treasury”, and since the amount of
taxes levied greatly exceeded the amount of these warrants the State was not incurring
any obl1gat1on 1n excess of revenues. People ex rel. Capron vs. Nelson, 344 Ill. ·
46, 176 N. E. 59 (1931).
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Illinois 7
· II. Financial Powers and Limitations——Continued
  V
C. Borrowing and Use of Credit-—Continued
(1) State—Continued
(b) The State shall never pay, assume or become re-
• sponsible for the debts or liabilities of, or any manner give, loan or
extend its credit to, or in aid, of any public or other corporation,
association or individual.12 n
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(c) The General Assembly shall have no power to re-
lease or extinguish, in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability or
obligation of any corporation or individual to this State or to any mu-
nicipal corporation therein.15
· (d) * * ’7‘ The General Assembly shall never loan
the credit of the State or make appropriations from the treasury thereof`,
in aid of railroads or canals: * * *.14
(2) Counties and Other Local Units
(a) No county, city township, school district or other
’ municipal corporation shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner
_ or for any purpose to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the
· aggregate exceeding five per centum on the value of the taxable property
therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for State and county
taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness. Any county, city,
• school district or other municipal corporation incurring any indebtedness
as aforesaid, shall before or at the time of doing so, provide for the
collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such
• 12Const1tut1on, Art. IV, Sec. 20.
A statute, authorizlnga gasoline tax refund to persons using gasoline purchased
for purpose Sp&%,;v$than the operation of motor vehicles wl thin the State was held
invalid as ? for gifts on the part of the State to individuals. Chicago Motor
Club vs. Kinney, 529 Ill. 120, 160 N. E. 165 (1928).
A bond issue authorized by the voters for the payment of a bonus to world war
veterans, was held not to violate this section, since the purposes of the act, to
promote a spirit of patriotism, to encourage the defense of the country in future
• conflicts, and to promote the public welfare, were public purposes, although the
manner ln which they found expression involved an element of private benefit. Hagler
vs. Small. 507 Ill. 460, 158 N. E. 849 (1925).
A statute providing for the paymentof pensions to all judges of courts of record
was held not to violate this section. The court said that such pensions are not void
as being grants to individuals because they serve the public in two ways: (1) By
encouraging young and able officers to remain in the service, and; (2) by retiring
from public service those who have become incapacitated from performing the duties
• as well as they might be performed by younger and more vigorous persons. De wolf
vs. Bowley, 555 Ill. 550, 189 N. E. 895 (1954).
13Constltut1on, Art. IV, Sec. 25.
14Const1tut1on, Separate Section 5 (Canals), as amended (1908).
The Legislature, however, is authorized to provide for the construction of a canal
· from Chicago to Utica and issue bonds not to exceed $20,000,000 for this purpose. Ibid.
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8 Illinois
II. Financial Powers and Limitations——Continued ·
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C. Borrowing and Use of Cr·edit—C0ntinued
(2) Counties and Other Local Units——Continned
deht as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof
C
within twenty years from the time of' contracting the same * ’?‘ ’¥‘.1"
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onstltutlon, Art. IX, Sec. 12. •
This section is mandatory and self-executing. East St. Louis and Interurban
water Company vs. C1ty of Belleville, 360 Ill. 490. 196 N. E. 442 (1935).
•*The rule of the majority of the states upon this common constitutional prohi-
b1t1on, where annual installments are concerned, is that the aggregate Indebtedness
is not at once created. Illinois holds to the opposite vlew by declarations of this
court that where a contract calls for the payment of annual installments an indebt-
edness Is at once created for the aggregate of all 1nstallments." Consequently, where
a c1ty had contracted to pay annual rental on water hydrants over a period of twenty- ·
five years, and the aggregate amount of that rental over the twen·ty—f1ve year perlod
exceeded the amount of the five percent debt llmltatlon of the city. the contract
was invalid. East St. Louis and Int·erurban water Companyvs. C1ty of Belleville, 360
Ill. 490. 196 N._ E. 442 (1935).
•'The assessment to be resorted to ln ascertaining the extent to which a munic-
fpalftymay lawfully become indebted is the last preceding assessment whlchls complete
at the time the llabfllty 1s·1ncurred =•= >•= =•<. It follows that the validity of a
debt 1s to be determined by. the ratio of indebtedness to the assessed valuation in •
effect when the debt was created. lf a debt 1s valid when created, It will not be-
come invalid thereafter, evenff 1t.should exceed five percent of some future assess-
ment.•• Kocsls vs. Chicago Park District, 362 Ill. 24. 198 N. E. 847. 852 (1935). `
The fnterest which wlll accrue on a proposed issue of bonds by a county is not ·
a part of the fndebtedness within the limitation of this section. Goodwlne vs.
Vermilion County. 271 Ill. 126, 110 N. E. 890 (-1915). .
warrants issued In anticipation of taxes to be collected, do not constitute a 1
·*debt¤ w1th1n the meaning of this section, provided the tax out of which they are , ‘
payable 1s actually levied, and the legal effect of the contract between the corpo- . _-
ration and the individual 1s such that there 1s no liability against the corporation. ‘
Such warrants are not a ••debt•• becausethey create no liability against the city,
and are payable only out of taxes already levied and in the process of collection.
C1ty of springfield vs. Edwards, B4 Ill. 626 (1s’7’7). ‘ .
A statute, authorizing the Board of Education of the City of Chicago to issue
$10,000,000 fn bonds, payable out of general taxation of the property within the
school district, the proceeds to be used for paying off_ tax anticipation warrants •
prevfously issued, was held unconstitutional. The court stated that these tax antic-
ipation warrants were payable only out of taxes already levied and that the only
remedy of the holders thereof was against the tax collecting officers. To` make the
school district or city liable by the fssuance of the contemplated bonds was uncon-
stltutlonal because that woul_d be making the corporation llable for a debt for which
it was in no wise responsible. Berman vs. Board of Education of Clty of Chicago,
360 Ill. 535, 196 N. E. 464 (1935).
when such tax anticipation warrants have been fssued, payable outof taxes levied, •
the holders thereof must be paid pro rata out of anyof- such taxes collected. Norfolk
and western Railway Company vs. Board of Education of City of Ch1cago,D1str1ct Court
N. D. Illinois, 14 F. Supp. 475 (1936).
Certificates In the sum of $12,000,000, the proceeds to be used to lmprove and
extend the water works system of the City of Chicago, payable solely out of the entire
revenue of the water works system of the city, were held not to constitute a ¤debt¤·
within the meaning of this section. The court held-that since these certificates
were payable out of the water works revenues only, and the plant itself was not •
pledged and the general credit of the city was not pledged that they would not con-
stitute an •*1ndebtedness•• within the contemplation of this section. ward vs. City
of Chicago. 342 Ill. 167, 173 N. E. 610 (1930). '
Following the above case the Federal Court of Appeals held that where an Illinois
city Issued certificates of indebtedness to pay for improvements in its water works
system, pledging the revenue of the whole plant, and Issuing a trust deed on the ·
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Illinois 9
II. Financial Powers and Limitations——Continued
•
C. Borrowing and Use of Credit——Continued
(2) Counties and Other Local Units——Continued
(b) No county, city, town, township or other munici-
• pality,shall ever become subscriber to the capital stock of any railroad
or private corporation, or make donation to or loan its credit in aid of
such corporation: * * *.1